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Endogenous growth theory has recently originated in economics.   Building on 
this theory, this chapter conceptualizes the phenomenon of endogenous growth in terms 
of some new ideas developed in the field of international business (IB). These ideas have 
so far been not linked to the notion of endogenous growth.  On the other hand, 
mainstream economics has not made much progress in exploring the MNC-government 
relationships through which growth-inducing “mechanics” are created, a topic of great 
importance and research in the IB-related discipline.  Both MNCs and governments 
complement each other in facilitating an efficient matching of ownership-specific assets 
(notably knowledge) with location-specific advantages, thereby enabling the developing 
host countries to realize potential growth in an intensified manner, a new mode of 
endogenous growth that counteracts the law of diminishing returns.  The phenomenon of 
MNC-cum-government-driven endogenous growth is thus conceptualized. 
 Transnational entrepreneurs—US-educated immigrant engineers whose activities span 
national borders—are creating new economic opportunities for formerly peripheral economies 
around the world. Talented immigrants who have studied and worked in the US are increasingly 
reversing the “brain drain” by returning to their home countries to take advantage of promising 
opportunities there. In so doing they are building technical communities that link their home 
countries to one of the world's leading centers of information and communications technologies, 
Silicon Valley. As the “brain drain” increasingly gives way to a process of “brain circulation,” 
networks of scientists and engineers are transferring technology, skill, and know-how between 
distant regional economies faster and more flexibly than most corporations. 
The development of technical communities that span national borders and boast as shared 
assets technical information, trust, and contacts have been largely overlooked in most accounts 
of globalization. This paper suggests that transnational communities may become as important as 
more commonly recognized actors—states and multinational corporations—in the growth of new 
centers of technology entrepreneurship. Moreover, these communities have the potential to play 
an increasingly important role in the evolution of global production networks. Transnational 
entrepreneurs and their communities provide a significant mechanism for the international 
diffusion of knowledge and the creation and upgrading of local capabilities--one that is distinct 
from, but complementary to, global production networks. 
 The first half of the paper analyzes the economic and technological context for the 
emergence of transnational communities and outlines their contributions to the emergence and 
upgrading of suppliers and nodes in global production networks.  
The paper then examines the cases of Taiwan, India and China in detail to illustrate how 
technical communities both complement and accelerate the development of international production networks. In Taiwan, a "reversal" of the brain drain fuelled the growth of a of 
transnational community that has created new sources of supply as well as contributing directly 
to the subsequent upgrading of local capabilities--thereby insuring Taiwan's position as a 
supplier of high value-added, design intensive components.  The Taiwanese case also illustrates 
how innovations seeded by transnational entrepreneurs have the potential to disrupt established 
hierarchies of suppliers. 
Both India and China boast large numbers of US-educated scientists and engineers and in 
each case well-developed ethnic professional communities have built economic and social 
bridges to their home countries. The Indian network has contributed to the emergence of a 
globally competitive software services industry, however there is little evidence of the return 
entrepreneurship that could accelerate the upgrading of India's capabilities. In China, by contrast, 
policymakers have aggressively courted return entrepreneurs from the US, with notable 
successes. Most striking is the merging of the Taiwanese and Mainland Chinese transnational 
communities--particularly in the semiconductor industry--through shared roots in Silicon 
Valley's professional and technical networks. This could have a lasting impact on the 
development of China. 
The paper concludes with speculations about the changing relationship between 
transnational technical communities and global production networks as well as some thoughts 
about directions for future research.  
 
I. Technical Communities and Industrial Decentralization 
Transnational technical communities are only possible because of advances in 
communication and transportation technologies and changes in the structure of technology 
  2 markets and competition. In the 1960s and 1970s, the dominant competitors in the computer 
industry were vertically integrated corporations that controlled all aspects of hardware and 
software production (the IBM or “national champion” model.) The rise of an alternative 
industrial model (the Silicon Valley model) spurred the introduction of the personal computer 
and initiated a radical shift to a more fragmented industrial structure organized around networks 
of increasingly specialized producers.  
Today, independent enterprises produce all of the components that were once internalized 
within a single large corporation—from application software, operating systems and computers 
to microprocessors and other components. The final systems are in turn marketed and distributed 
by still other enterprises. Within each of these horizontal segments there is, in turn, increasing 
specialization of production and a deepening social division of labor. In the semiconductor 
industry, for example, independent producers specialize in chip design, fabrication, packaging, 
testing, as well as different segments of the manufacturing materials and equipment sector. A 
new generation of firms has in turn emerged in the late 1990s that specializes in providing 
intellectual property in the form of design modules rather than the entire chip design.  
This change in industry structure appears as a shift to market relations. The number of 
actors in the industry has increased dramatically and competition within many (but not all) 
horizontal layers has increased as well. Yet this is far from the classic auction market mediated 
by price signals alone; the decentralized system depends heavily on the coordination provided by 
cross cutting social structures and institutions. While Silicon Valley’s entrepreneurs innovate in 
increasingly specialized niche markets, intense communications in turn insure the speedy, often 
unanticipated, recombination of these specialized components into changing end products. This 
decentralized system provides significant advantages over a more integrated model in a volatile 
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with the process of specialization and recombination. 
The deepening social division of labor in the industry creates opportunities for innovation 
in formerly peripheral regions—opportunities that did not exist in an era of highly integrated 
producers. The vertical specialization associated with the new system continually generates 
entrepreneurial opportunities. By exploiting these opportunities in their home countries, 
transnational entrepreneurs can build independent centers of specialization and innovation, while 
simultaneously maintaining ties to Silicon Valley to monitor and respond to fast-changing and 
uncertain markets and technologies. They are also well positioned to establish cross-regional 
partnerships that facilitate the integration of their specialized components into end products. 
The social structure of a technical community thus appears essential to the organization 
of production at the global as well as the local level. In the old industrial model, the technical 
community was primarily inside of the corporation. The firm was seen as the privileged 
organizational form for the creation and internal transfer of knowledge, particularly 
technological know-how that is difficult to codify. In regions like Silicon Valley, where the 
technical community transcends firm boundaries, however, such tacit knowledge is often 
transferred through informal communications or the inter-firm movement of individuals. This 
suggests that the multinational corporation may no longer be the advantaged or preferred 
organizational vehicle for transferring knowledge or personnel across national borders. 
Transnational communities provide an alternative and often more flexible and responsive 
mechanism for long distance transfers of skill and know-how—particularly between very 
different business cultures or environments.  
  4 In fact, as recently as the 1970s, only the world’s largest corporations had the resources 
and capabilities to grow internationally. These multinational corporations expanded primarily by 
establishing marketing offices or branch plants overseas.  Today, by contrast, new transportation 
and communications technologies allow even the smallest firms to build partnerships with 
foreign producers and tap overseas expertise, cost-savings, and markets. Start-ups in Silicon 
Valley today are often global actors from the day they begin their operations. Many raise capital 
from Asia, others subcontract manufacturing to Taiwan or rely on software development in 
India, and virtually all seek to eventually sell their products in Asian markets.   
The scarce resource in this new environment is the ability to locate foreign partners 
quickly and to manage complex business relationships across cultural and linguistic boundaries.  
This is particularly a challenge in high-technology industries in which products, markets, and 
technologies are continually being redefined—and where product cycles are routinely as short as 
six months.   
First-generation immigrants, like the Chinese and Indian engineers of Silicon Valley, 
who have the language and cultural as well as the technical skills to function well in both the 
United States and foreign markets are distinctly positioned to play a central role in this 
environment. By becoming transnational entrepreneurs, these immigrants can provide the critical 
contacts, information, and cultural know-how that link dynamic—but distant—regions in the 
global economy. They can create social networks that enable even the smallest producers to 
locate and maintain mutually beneficial collaborations across great distances and facilitate access 
to foreign sources of capital, technical skills, and markets.  The proliferation of such 
relationships over time can result in the creation of a transnational technical community—one 
  5 that can transfer the market and technological know-how needed to support a dynamic of 
industrial upgrading. 
 
Technical Communities and Global Production Networks 
  It is no coincidence that transnational technical communities have emerged as central 
actors in the world economy at the same time that global production networks (GPN) are 
increasingly replacing multinational firms with their stand-alone overseas investments (Ernst and 
Kim, 2001.) Communities of technically skilled immigrants with business experience and 
connections in the US are ideally positioned to accelerate the diversification and technical 
upgrading of supplier networks in their home countries, and as entrepreneurs they can also 
facilitate the emergence of new sources of supply and/or destabilize established hierarchies in 
global production networks.  
Transnational communities thus play an important and complementary role to 'network 
flagships' in global production networks. US-educated returnees provide a direct mechanism for 
transferring the skill and tacit knowledge that can dramatically accelerate industrial upgrading in 
their developing countries. In addition they frequently coordinate relationships between the 
network flagships and suppliers, particularly when they are based in regions with differing 
languages and business cultures. This role ranges from helping to identify appropriate OEM 
suppliers to facilitating the ongoing (and often face-to-face) inter-firm communications required 
by rapid the pace of change in the industry. 
Transnational communities likewise provide a mechanism for seeding entirely new 
centers of low-cost (at least initially) supply in less developed regions. Taiwan's leading personal 
computers suppliers, including Acer, Mitac, and Compeq, for example, got their initial contracts 
  6 for IBM-compatible PCs in the early 1980s from Chinese entrepreneurs in Silicon Valley. Senior 
Indian engineers in large U.S. corporations were similarly among the first to outsource software 
services to India, thereby helping to establish the reputation and credibility of producers in 
regions like Bangalore. Over time, if transnational business connections deepen and expand they 
can accelerate the upgrading of the technical capabilities in these locales. 
Finally, transnational entrepreneurs are well positioned to identify new market 
opportunities in global production networks--and even to innovate and destabilize established 
hierarchies of production. When Morris Chang returned from the US to pioneer the foundry 
model at Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation, he accelerated the vertical 
fragmentation of semiconductor production and made it possible for chip designers and 
intellectual property producers all over the world become part of international production 
networks in electronics. It also enabled a start-up like Taiwan's Via Technologies to threaten 
Intel's position in low-end microprocessors. 
TSMC quickly became a world-class chip manufacturer because it was able to continue 
attracting experienced Taiwanese semiconductor engineers and managers from Silicon Valley. 
The Taiwanese transnational community also coordinated the ongoing relationships between 
TSMC and its US-based equipment suppliers (like Applied Materials) and its customers (both 
small chip designers and more established producers.) In short, transnational technical 
communities can serve as important mechanisms for the coordination, upgrading, and 
transformation of global production networks.   
 
Transnational Entrepreneurs and Industrial Upgrading in Taiwan 
The experience of Taiwan illustrates how a transnational community contributes to both 
the creation and upgrading of nodes in global production networks. In the 1960s and 1970s, the 
  7 relationship between Taiwan and the US was a textbook First-Third-world relationship. US 
businesses invested in Taiwan to take advantage of its low-wage manufacturing labor. 
Meanwhile the best and the brightest Taiwanese engineering students came to the US for 
graduate education and created a classic “brain drain” when they chose to remain pursue 
professional opportunities in the US. In fact, Taiwan sent more doctoral candidates in science 
and engineering to the US during the 1980s than any other country, including entire graduating 
classes from Taiwan’s most elite engineering universities: National Taiwan University, National 
Chiaotung University, and Tsinghua University. See Figure 3. 
This relationship changed dramatically in the late 1980s. Many of these US-educated 
engineers began to return home, drawn by active government recruitment and the opportunities 
created by rapid economic development. The upgrading of Taiwan's technological infrastructure 
and capacities in through rapidly growing OEM ties to foreign customers as well as through local 
learning-by-doing, spurred a reversal of the brain drain (See Figure 1.) At the same time a 
growing cohort of highly mobile engineers began to work in both the US and Taiwan, 
commuting across the Pacific regularly. Typically Taiwan-born, US-educated engineers, these 
“astronauts” have the professional contacts and language skills to function fluently in both the 
Silicon Valley and Taiwanese business cultures and to draw on the complementary strengths of 
the two regional economies.  
 
 
  8 Figure 1.  Returnees to Taiwan from the US: 1970-1997 
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Source: National Youth Commission, Taiwan. 
 
 
Miin Wu is a classic transnational entrepreneur. Wu immigrated to the US in the early 
1970s to pursue graduate training in electrical engineering. After earning a doctorate from 
Stanford University in 1976, Wu recognized that there were no opportunities to use his new 
skills in economically backward Taiwan and remained in the US, working for more than a 
decade in senior positions at Silicon Valley-based semiconductor companies including Siliconix 
and Intel. He also gained entrepreneurial experience as one of the founding members of VLSI 
Technology. By the late 1980s, when economic conditions in Taiwan had improved Wu returned 
home to start his own semiconductor company, Macronix Co. He located the firm in the Hsinchu 
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classmates and friends, with him. In 1995, Macronix went public on the Taiwan stock exchange 
and the following year became the first Taiwanese company to list on NASDAQ.  
While the Hsinchu Science Park was not the cause of Taiwan's successes in information 
technology industries, its success reflects the fast expanding ties between the two regions. After 
its first eight years (1980-88) the Park was home to only 94 companies with under $2 billion in 
annual sales collectively and attracted only a handful of US-educated engineers annually. By the 
early 1990s the Park had become a destination for hundreds of returnees each year--and they 
started new companies at an accelerating rate. By 1989, 2,840 Taiwanese had returned from the 
US to work in the Hsinchu Science Park. And these returnees were disproportionately likely to 
start their own companies. Some 40% of the companies located in the Science Park (110 
companies out of a total of 284) in 1999 were started by US-educated engineers, many of whom 
had considerable managerial or entrepreneurial experience in Silicon Valley. These returnees in 
turn actively recruited former colleagues and friends from Silicon Valley to return to Taiwan. 
The Park was attractive to engineers from the US in part because of its location close to 
the headquarters of Taiwan's leading public research institute, Industrial Technology and 
Research Institute (ITRI) and its subsidiary, the Electronics Research and Service Organization 
(ERSO) which in the 1980s spearheaded a technological leapfrogging through the government-
led acquisition of semiconductor manufacturing technology from the U.S. Hsinchu is also the 
home of two of Taiwan’s leading engineering universities which had dramatically increased 
enrollments and research capacity in the 1970s and 1980s. Finally, the Hsinchu Science Park 
offered a range of fiscal incentives for qualified technology investments and provided returnees 
  10 with preferential access to scarce, high quality housing and to the only Chinese-American school 
in Taiwan—both of which are located on the park grounds.1 
In addition to permanent returnees like Wu, a growing population of  “astronauts” works 
in both places and spends much of their lives on airplanes. While their families may be based on 
either side of the Pacific (most often they stay in California because of the lifestyle advantages), 
these engineers travel between Silicon Valley and Hsinchu once or even twice a month, taking 
advantage of the opportunities to play middlemen bridging the two regional economies. This 
includes many Taiwanese angel investors and venture capitalists as well as executives and 
engineers from companies like Macronix with activities in the two regions.  
This lifestyle is, of course, only possible because of the improvements in transportation 
and communications technologies. However it does not mean these “astronauts” are rootless. 
Their dense personal networks and intimate local knowledge of both Silicon Valley and Hsinchu 
play a central role in coordinating economic linkages between the two regions. Even engineers 
who remain in Silicon Valley are typically integrated into the transnational community. Many 
work for start-ups or large firms with activities in both regions. Some moonlight as consultants 
on product development for Taiwanese firms. Others return to Taiwan regularly for technical 
seminars sponsored by government agencies or professional associations.  
As engineers travel between the two regions they carry technical knowledge as well as 
contacts, capital, and information about new opportunities and new markets. Moreover, this 
information moves almost as quickly between these distant regions as it does within Hsinchu and 
Silicon Valley because of the density of the social networks and the shared identities and trust 
                                                            
1 The incentives include low interest loans, a five-year income tax break for the first nine 
years of operation, the right to retain earnings of up to 200% of paid-in capital, accelerated 
depreciation of R&D equipment, and low cost land. This information and the data on the Park in 
the following paragraph comes from the Science Park Administration, Hsinchu Science-Based 
Industrial Park. 
  11 within the community. These transnational ties have dramatically accelerated the flows of skill, 
know-how, and market information between the two regions. In the words of a Silicon Valley 
based Taiwanese engineer:  
If you live in the United States its hard to learn what is happening in Taiwan, and if you 
live in Taiwan its hard to learn what is going on in the U.S. Now that people are going 
back and forth between Silicon Valley and Hsinchu so much more frequently, you can 
learn about new companies and new opportunities in both places almost instantaneously.2 
 
In the words of another engineer who worked for IBM in Silicon Valley for 18 years before 
returning to Taiwan: “There’s a very small world between Taiwan and Silicon Valley.” 
(Barnathan, 1992) Others say Taiwan is like an extension of Silicon Valley. The former CEO of 
Acer America claims that the continuous interaction between the Hsinchu and Silicon Valley has 
generated “multiple positive feedbacks” that enhance business opportunities in both regions.3 
A closely-knit community of Taiwanese returnees, astronauts, and US-based engineers 
and entrepreneurs like Miin Wu has become the bridge between Silicon Valley and the 
comparably sized region that extends from Taipei to the Hsinchu Science Park. By transferring 
technical know-how, organizational models, and contacts, they have accelerated the upgrading of 
Taiwan’s technological infrastructure—and increased the importance of its suppliers to global 
production networks. By the end of the 1990s, Taiwan was the world’s largest producer of 
notebook computers and a range of related PC components including motherboards, monitors, 
scanners, power supplies, and keyboards--and they had the capacity to shift quickly into new 
products such as wireless phones. (See Figures 2a & 2b.) And less than two decades after TSMC 
was founded, Taiwanese firms controlled two-thirds of world foundry capacity, with IC 
manufacturing capabilities on par with the leading Japanese and US producers.  
 
                                                            
2 C.B Liaw interview, August 28, 1996 
3 Ron Chwang interview, March 25, 1997 
  12 Figure 2a.  Personal Computer OEM Customers and Taiwanese Partners, 1999 
 
Taiwan Companies   OEM Customers  
Mitac (Desktop PC)   HP, Compaq 
FIC (Desktop PC)   HP, Compaq 
Ta-Tung (Desktop PC)   HP 
GVC (Desktop PC)   HP 
Mitac (Notebook PC)   Compaq, HP, SUN 
Inventec (Server, Desktop PC, Notebook PC)   Compaq  
Quanta (Notebook PC)  Dell, Gateway, Apple, Siemens, 
IBM, HP 
Arima (Notebook PC)   Compaq 
FIC (Notebook PC)   NEC Japan 
Twin-Head (Notebook PC)   NEC, HP, Sharp, Winbook 
Compal (Notebook PC)   Fujitz, HP, Dell, Toshiba 
GVC (Notebook PC)   PBNEC 
Acer (Notebook PC)   Acer/TI, IBM, Apple 
Alpha-Top (Notebook PC)   Apple, PBNEC  
Clevo (Notebook PC)    Hitachi, Epson 
 
Source: 1. C. Wang, “The Information Technology Industry @ Taiwan”, The Financial  
             Information, Taipei, Taiwan, 1999. 
             2. “Taiwan Notebook PC is the World No. 1”, Global Views Monthly 162,  
             Taipei, Taiwan, December, 1999.  
 
Figure 2b. Mobile Phone OEM Customers and Taiwanese Partners, 2000 
 
 
Customer   Product  Taiwanese OEM Partner  
Motorola  Mobile Phone  DBTEL Inc. (cordless phone); Acer Peripheral  
 IC Mfg.   TSMC; UMC 
 PCB  Wus Printed Circuit Co; United PCB Co.  
   Zio-De;   




 Power Supply  Lite-On (power supply, LED) 
 Panel  Picvue Elec. (LCD/CRT) 
Ericsson PCB  Compeq 
 Receiver  Mei-Lui 
 Panel  Compeq (PCB) 
Alcatel  Mobile Phone  GVC (Desktop PC, Motherboard) 
 Panel  Compeq (PCB) 
Qualcomm  PCB  Wus Printed Circuit Co. 
 Panel  Compeq (PCB)  
 
Source: Telecommunication Network, Special Edition, Taiwan, 2000.  
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The growing integration of the technological communities of Silicon Valley and Hsinchu 
offers benefits to both economies. Silicon Valley remains the center of new product definition 
and developer of leading edge technologies, while Taiwan offers world-class manufacturing, 
flexible development and integration, and access to key customers and markets in China and 
Southeast Asia. Taiwan has also become a significant and fast-growing source of capital for 
Silicon Valley-based start-ups. Unlike the arms-length and top down technology transfers 
between large firms that characterized the relations between Japan and the US in the 1980s, the 
Silicon Valley-Hsinchu relationship today consists of formal and informal collaborations 
between individual investors and entrepreneurs, small and medium-sized firms, as well as the 
divisions of larger companies located on both sides of the Pacific.  
In this complex mix, the social and professional ties among Taiwanese engineers at home 
and their counterparts in the US are often as important as more formal corporate alliances and 
partnerships. These relationships have been essential to establishing, maintaining, and upgrading 
Taiwan's role in global production networks--through OEM and ODM relationships and the 
myriad of other inter-firm partnerships that exploit the distinct and complementary capabilities of 
Silicon Valley and Hsinchu-based producers. 
  Taiwan's policymakers created an environment that attracted US-educated engineers to 
return home in growing numbers, but only after two decades of investment in the domestic 
environment. The elements of this environment included: a well developed skill base and 
technical infrastructure, an attractive physical environment for entrepreneurs, a growing venture 
capital industry, and close professional ties to Silicon Valley. Once in place, the transnational 
community accelerated the pace of innovation and industrial upgrading of Taiwan's PC and 
  14 semiconductor industries beyond the expectations of the policymakers. This experience suggests 
that foreign-born engineers are only likely to return permanently to their home countries when 
they perceive that the professional opportunities outweigh, or at least match, those available to 
them in the US.4  
 
Reversing the Brain Drain? The Case of India and China 
 India and China have both suffered greatly from the brain drain. In the 1990s these two 
countries each sent more students to the US for higher education than any other country. In 
1998-99 alone, for example, 10.4% of international students enrolled in US higher education, or 
51,001 students were from China, excluding Hong Kong, and 7.6%, or 37,482 students were 
from India (Open Doors, 2000.) The dominance of Chinese and Indian students in US higher 
education is most pronounced at the doctoral level, and in science and engineering fields in 
particular. Between 1990 and 1996, 16,749 Chinese and 8,211 Indian students received PhDs in 
the US, with 92% of the Chinese and 83% of Indian degrees in science and engineering (NSF, 
1999). See Figure 3. 
China and India are therefore particularly well positioned to benefit from "brain 
circulation" and reversal of the brain drain. Data on the number of foreign students returning 
from the US to their home countries is limited, however it is clear that students from India and 
China have tended to remain in the US in greater numbers than their other foreign-born 
counterparts. An NSF study reports, for example, that in 1996, 87% of Chinese and 84% of 
Indian PhD students with temporary work visas planned to stay in the US after graduation, 
compared with only 48% of Taiwanese students (NSF, 1999). 
 
                                                            
4 For more on the Taiwanese case, see Ernst (1999), Saxenian (2000),  Hsu (1999.) 



















India: From Brain Drain to Brain Circulation 
In the 1970s and 1980s, Indians were second only to Taiwanese as recipients of U.S. 
PhDs in engineering and science. The technical and managerial capabilities of these US-educated 
Indian professionals are clear from their continued entrepreneurial successes in Silicon Valley. 
By 2000 Indian engineers were at the helm of 972 Silicon Valley-based technology companies, 
which accounted for approximately $5 billion in sales and 25,811 jobs. Moreover, the pace of 
Indian entrepreneurship accelerated rapidly in the 1990s: while Indians were running only 3% of 
the technology companies started between 1980 and 1984, they were running 10% of those 
started between 1995 and 2000. (Saxenian, 1999) However, in contrast with their Taiwanese 
counterparts, few of these highly skilled Indians have returned home to become transnational 
  16 entrepreneurs. Most today play an arms-length role linking US firms with India's software 
programming skill. 
US-educated Indian professionals institutionalized their social networks in the 1990s 
through the formation of two of Silicon Valley's most vibrant associations: The Indus 
Entrepreneur (TiE) and the Silicon Valley Indian Professionals Association (SIPA.)5 However 
they were slow to build direct ties to India. As they gained seniority in US corporations during 
the 1980s and 1990s many NRIs were instrumental in convincing senior management to 
establish operations in India to take advantage of the substantial wage differentials for software 
skill. By the late 1990s, as India's reputation as a supplier of software talent, a large proportion of 
large American corporations were subcontracting programming to Indian suppliers (an OEM 
relationship), and most large Silicon Valley technology companies had their own development 
laboratories in regions like Bangalore. 
In 1999 some of Silicon Valley's most successful Indian entrepreneurs began actively 
build bridges to India. Within two years, TiE had established chapters in Bangalore, Bombay, 
Delhi, Hyderabad, Calcutta, and Chennai. The growing attention in India to these successful NRI 
entrepreneurs combined with the market successes of Indian firms like Infosys, Wipro and 
Satyam created role models for young Indian engineers and contributed to growing interest in IT 
entrepreneurship. The NRIs in turn invested in promising start-ups and venture funds and begun 
to serve as role models and advisors for local entrepreneurs. 
While traffic between India and the US has increased substantially in the recent years, the 
great majority of US-educated engineers remain reluctant to return home permanently. There is 
no data on these trends, but long-time residents of Bangalore report there has still been only "a 
                                                            
5 For more information on the development and organization of the Indian community in 
Silicon Valley see Saxenian (1999a) 
  17 trickle" of permanent returnees to that city. Interviews in Silicon Valley suggest that Indian 
professionals in the US are likely to turn to India for software programming and development 
resources, and that many are interested in working in India for a limited time period, running a 
US subsidiary or development office. However few have followed the Taiwanese and Chinese 
pattern of returning home permanently to start new technology companies or work for 
established or returnee firms. 
One of the most significant roles the Silicon Valley community has played in India is in 
its attempts to influence government policy. In 1999, for example, Silicon Valley entrepreneur 
K.B. Chandrasekhar led a Committee on Venture Capital for the Securities and Exchange Board 
of India. The committee's report developed a comprehensive vision for the growth of India's VC 
industry, and proposed a series of regulatory and institutional reforms to achieve this goal based 
on a survey of the global experience.6 They have also convened forums bringing together top 
policymakers and NRIs to discuss deregulation of the telecommunications industry. Efforts such 
as these could contribute to the creation of a more attractive context for returning 
entrepreneurship, particularly if accompanied by other policy reforms directed at improving the 
local and regulatory environment for innovation. 
Indian engineers in Silicon Valley report that business conditions improved dramatically 
in India in the 1990s.  The establishment of the Software Technology Parks (STPs) scheme has 
provided export-oriented software firms in designated zones tax exemptions for five years and 
guaranteed access to high-speed satellite links and reliable electricity. The economic 
liberalization that began in 1991, particularly the removal of duties and licenses on imports of 
software and industrial equipment, were essential to the growth of the software industry.  Yet 
                                                            
6 See the Report of K.B. Chandrasekhar Committee on Venture Capital to the Securities and 
Exchange Board of India at http://www.sebi.gov.in/ 
  18 even today expatriates complain about bureaucratic restrictions, corrupt and unresponsive 
officials, and an infrastructure that causes daily frustrations—from unreliable power supplies, 
water shortages, and backward and costly telecommunications facilities to dangerous and 
congested highways. 7 
The Indian software industry boomed in the late 1990s, with $4 billion in software 
exports by 2000, but most of the growth was still driven primarily by low-value added services 
(Arora et al, 2001). Indian companies have moved beyond body shopping exclusively (hiring 
low cost Indian programmers to work onsite for foreign customers) and shifted to offshore 
production (in India) that allows for the local accumulation of experience and learning. Over 
time, OEM relationships with major US customers have led to significant improvements in 
quality and the ability to take on increasingly complex projects.8 However Indian software 
companies have been so profitable that they face few incentives to address higher value-added 
segments of the market--or to support entrepreneurs, either internal or external, to do so. As a 
result, the industry remains dominated by a small number of large export-oriented corporations 
who serve as an important node in global production networks, but that have minimal ties with 
each other, local entrepreneurs, or the science and technology base in India.  
India still lacks a critical mass of returnees or transnational entrepreneurs. And there are 
few Taiwan-style “astronauts” or U.S.-educated Indian engineers who have their feet sufficiently 
in both worlds to transfer up-to-date information and know-how about markets and technologies 
or to build the long-term relationships and that would accelerate the upgrading of India’s 
                                                            
7 A 1999 study by McKinsey & Co estimates that as much as $23b in IT export revenues and 
650,000 jobs failed to materialize in India over an 8-year period because of limitations of the 
telecomm infrastructure. 
8 There are more CMM level five companies in India than elsewhere in the world. 
  19 technological infrastructure. This would include not simply transforming the software industry 
but also developing a viable hardware and manufacturing sector. 
Communication between the technology communities India and the US continue to grow. 
Alumni associations from the Indian Institutes of Technology are starting to organize events in 
Silicon Valley. Some of the large software companies have established subsidiaries and alliances 
in the US. And venture capital firms are emerging to invest in firms that link Silicon Valley's 
technology and market access with India's software skills. So while reversal of the “brain drain” 
is not yet on the horizon, there is a small but fast growing professional community linking 
Silicon Valley and regions like Bangalore—one that could play an important role in upgrading 
the Indian IT sector in the future.   
 
China: Reversing the Brain Drain? 
US-educated students from Mainland China--like their Taiwanese counterparts a decade 
earlier--started to return home in growing numbers in the late1990s. A survey by the China 
Research Center and the US International Education Association found that 30,000 (18.8%) of 
160,000 students who studied in the US between 1978 and 1998 had returned to China (World 
Journal, 8/29/99). A more recent study by the Beijing Science & Technology Committee claims 
that 140,000 students returned to China between 1996 and 2000 and that these returnees group 
had started 3,000 firms with a total output of $1.B (People's Daily, 1/3/01.) Another report 
claims that over 20,000 overseas students have returned to Beijing to start companies since 
1988.9 (The findings of the latter studies should be treated with some caution because of their 
source and more likely reflect trends rather than accurate numbers.) 
                                                            
9 People's Daily: http://www.zgc.gov.cn/news/dailynews/000911-4.htm 
  20 There have been two observable waves of Chinese returnees from the United States. In 
the mid and late 1990s, a sizeable cohort of US-educated Mainlanders moved to Beijing to start 
telecommunications and Internet-related companies, or to run branches of US-based companies 
targeting the China market. These returnees were typically recent graduates, drawn from all over 
the U.S., with graduate training in business management or engineering, but limited work 
experience. One of the most successful firms of this era is AsiaInfo, a NASDAQ-listed company 
started by returnees from Texas that is now China's largest systems integrator for the 
telecommunications and Internet industry.   
A distinct second, and apparently larger, wave of returnees began in 2000 as a result of 
substantial foreign investments in semiconductor manufacturing capabilities. The Semiconductor 
Manufacturing International Corp. (SMIC) and Shanghai Grace Semiconductor Manufacturing 
Corporation, for example, both of received over US $1.5 billion from consortia of US, 
Taiwanese and Chinese investors to build IC production lines in Shanghai to serve the China 
market. The returnees joining these ventures likely to be older and more experienced 
semiconductor engineers and managers from Silicon Valley and/or Taiwan than the earlier wave 
of Mainland returnees. Hundreds of Silicon Valley and Taiwan-based enterprises in chip design, 
packaging and testing, equipment installation, and ancillary services have been lured to the 
region as well, in part by aggressive recruitment by Shanghai officials, constituting an 
increasingly integrated and complete industrial production chain for microelectronics.  
  While this certainly does not amount to a full-scale "reversal" of the brain drain, the 
increasing return of US-educated engineers and scientists educated has contributed greatly to 
China's growing role in global production networks. In the 1990s Taiwanese PC firms shifted 
manufacturing of low-end components, such as power supplies, mice, keyboards, cases, and 
  21 monitors, to China, particularly the Dongguan region in Southern China to take advantage of 
substantially lower cost labor and land (Tong, 2000).10   



























































Note: The majority (90%) of Taiwan's overseas production is in Mainland China 
Source: 1. C. Huang, “R.O.C.: Republic of computers”, The Common Wealth, Taipei,  
                  Taiwan, 1995.  
2. http://mic.iii.org.tw/english/asiait/issues/special/1998/98sp-1.htm 
 
In the late 1990s, Taiwanese producers of higher value-added products such as scanners, 
motherboards, video card, and laptop computers began shifting activities to China as well, this 
further north, to Shanghai and nearby Suzhou and Kunshan, in Jiangsu Province. These 
companies increasingly moved their supplier networks and management teams as well, setting up 
                                                            
10 These high tech Investments represent an extension of the earlier wholesale shift of labor 
Intensive Taiwanese Industries such as plastic and rubber products, electric and electronic 
appliances, and garments and footwear In the Pearl River Delta region of Southern China (Chen, 
19xx.) 
  22 integrated production centers from which to serve international OEM clients. By 2001, it was 
estimated that some 250,000 Taiwanese, including the families of plant managers and engineers, 
were living in the greater Shanghai area.      
This latter wave, which has been associated with the merging of Taiwanese and Mainland 
Chinese transnational communities, appears to be transferring high-level PC and semiconductor-
related skill, know-how and capabilities to Shanghai more rapidly than they were transferred to 
Taiwan in the 1980s and 1990s. Many observers predict that China will be the world's largest 
producer of information technology hardware within a decade--and an important new node in the 
industry's global production networks. 
 
Building the Bridge to Silicon Valley  
Since China began allowing large numbers of students abroad for study in the early 
1990s, policymakers have recognized the opportunity to tap this pool of foreign-educated 
Chinese for domestic development purposes. While the most desirable option would be to recruit 
all of the ‘‘Overseas students’’ back to China, this initially proved difficult because of the large 
gap in living and working conditions between China and the more developed West. As a result, 
local and central governments pursued two types of strategy in attempts to reverse the brain 
drain: 
•  Government Support of Technical and Business Exchange 
 
Chinese policymakers have devoted substantial resources to promoting technical and 
business exchanges that involve overseas Chinese students. This typically involves events such 
as conferences, investigation tours, joint research projects, and exhibits. Such activities are 
designed to involve scientists and researchers, business people, and policy makers in cross-
  23 regional exchanges of know-how and information. They also provide opportunities for overseas 
mainland professionals to build relationships with their domestic counterparts. In some cases a 
local and central government agency will develop a program that directly funds such events, in 
others it will subsidizes non-government agencies and the private sector to sponsor such 
activities.  
In the late 1990s, Chinese policymakers, academic institutions and technology companies 
increased their commitment to improving external communications, particularly with Silicon 
Valley's Chinese community. They sponsored a growing number of events and programs in the 
US, while also inviting Overseas Chinese academics and industry representatives to China to 
attend conferences and other events. In addition, the Ministry of Education established the 
‘‘Chunhui Program’’ to finance short-term trips to China by Overseas Chinese who were trained 
abroad to participate in technology-associated activities such as conferences, research projects or 
other authorized programs. Many of Silicon Valley's Chinese professionals have participated in 
these programs. 
•  Programs to Encourage Return Entrepreneurship 
Policy makers in China, at both local and central levels, have also attempted to attract 
overseas students home to start their own technology companies. Representatives of cabinet-
level ministries as well as municipal governments from large cities such as Shanghai and Beijing 
pay regular visits to Silicon Valley to recruit Chinese technology professionals to return home. 
The visiting Chinese officials usually hold dinners or meetings with Mainlanders and use the 
occasion to publicize the favorable policy and business environment in China.  
Many municipal governments have established "Returning Students Venture Parks" within 
the Development Zones of High & New Technology Enterprise. These parks are exclusively for 
  24 enterprises run by returnees and while they offer infrastructure and financial benefits like other 
science parks, they also address special needs of returnees, from accelerating bureaucratic 
processes involved with establishing residency to insuring access to prestigious primary and 
secondary schools for their children. See Figure 5. 
  25 Figure 5. Distributed electronically to Bay Area China Network (8/11/98) with subject heading:  
A Great Business Opportunity for You 
 
A Briefing on China Suzhou Pioneering Park for Overseas Chinese Scholars 
 
Sponsors:  
Chinese Scholarly Exchange Service Center, Ministry of Education 
Torch Program Office, Ministry of Science and Technology 
Jiangsu Service Center for the Shift of Qualified Personnel 
Jiancsu Science and Technology Commission 
The Administrative Committee of the Suzhou New Technology District 
Suzhou Science and Technology Commission 
 
Location: 
The Park is located in the Suzhou New District (Suzhou National New & High Technology Industrial Development Zone) to the west of the old city proper of 
Suzhou. The district is only 80km away from Shanghai and 1.5 hour drive from Shanghai Hongqiao Airport. 
 
Mission: 
To create a favorable environment for exploitation of research results and development of small and medium-sized technology based enterprises by providing all 
around service and quality facilities 
 
Target clients: 
Technology-based companies and research institutes run by students and scholars studying or working or returned from abroad 
 
Incentives for tenants: 
•  Three year refund of business tax starting the first day of operation 
•  Three year-refund of the local part of VAT 
•  Exemption from income tax in the first two profit-making years, six-year reduction of the rate by 50% that and then levied at a special rate of 15% for 
the next three years 
•  Minimum registered capital of US$10,000 provided for technology consultancy or service provider, US$60,000 for manufacturing enterprises  
•  Application priority for different-level grants and funds 
•  Application priority for certificate of new & high technology product/enterprise 
•  Building management and business services 
•  Free provision of registration formalities 
•  Provision of advice on policy and technical issues 
•  Business promotion 
•  Assistance in obtaining financing and refunds of duties 
•  Provision of training programs 
 
Progress to date: 
A news conference was held in Beijing this February to declare the establishment of the Park. The six sponsors have jointly set up the Torch New & High 
Technology Investment and Guarantee Company and registration is now underway. The company is not-for-profit and will specialize in venture capital and credit 
guarantees for tenants of the park. 
 
Building: 
The park owns one four-story building with floor space of 10,000 square meters. It hosts 88 units ranging from 20 to 100 sq meters. Services and facilities include 
the following: 
-Conference room with conferencing facilities 
-Seminar room 
-Product display chamber 
-Internet access, central air conditioning 
-Reception 
-Fax, typing , word-processing, and photocopying services 
-Air ticket booking, hotel room reservations 
-24-hour security services 
 
Applicants and companies: 
Til now, the Park has received more than 50 applications and 30 of them are in operation. Business of theses companies mainly covers electronics, biotech, 
mechanics (sic), computer software, and environmental protection. Presidents or managing directors of these companies have studied in U.S.A., Japan, France, 
and U.K. 
 
China Suzhou Pioneering Park for Overseas Chinese Scholars invites you to apply today. 
 
 
  26 By 2000, there were 23 "Returning Students Science Parks" across China, and many 
other municipalities had policies to attract returning students but no park. The "Returning 
Students Science Park" in the Zhongguancun (Haidian) district of Beijing, for example, reports 
that it housed 48 companies and 68 returning students in 1998. This is the oldest and largest of 
the three overseas student parks located in Beijing--which collectively housed 114 companies. It 
is difficult to determine the extent to which such policies toward returning students have 
contributed to China's success in technology industries, or even to the rate of return of overseas 
students. However it is worth noting that these policies are quite similar to those policies pursued 
by Taiwanese policymakers in the 1970s and 1980s that played a central role in the creation of a 
transnational community linking Taiwan and Silicon Valley. 
The evidence from Silicon Valley suggests that Mainland Chinese professionals, like 
their Taiwanese predecessors, maintain professional as well as personal ties to China even while 
working in the US. There are half dozen Chinese professional associations in the region that 
range in size from 200 to over 1000 members.11 While originally formed to organize social 
activities and help new immigrants overcome the feeling of isolation in a foreign culture, they 
have become important forums for exchanging news, contacts, and business information about 
China. These associations sponsor regular business tours to China, receive delegations of 
Chinese government officials, and serve as conduits for Chinese firms recruiting in the Valley. In 
1998, for example, the North American Chinese Semiconductor Association co-sponsored a two-
week tour of China’s semiconductor industry for a delegation of local engineers. The group 
produced a scientific report that was widely circulated among Mainland Chinese in the Valley. 
                                                            
11 These are separate from an equal number of Taiwanese professional associations in the 
Valley. The Taiwanese and Mainland Chinese have established separate organizations for many 
reasons having to do with history and culture, as well as timing of their arrival in the US, but this 
may change in the future. 
  27 The alumni associations of the elite Chinese secondary schools such as Beijing University and 
Qinghua University have active Bay Area chapters that provide an additional direct link back to 
China.  
Mainland Chinese have primarily arrived in the US during the 1990s, and so have started 
far fewer companies than the Taiwanese and Indian engineers, who began coming to the US in 
the 1970s. However those who have started companies have focused almost exclusively on 
developing products and services for the Chinese market. The dominant model among Mainland 
start-ups is to incorporate in the US and locate headquarters in Silicon Valley while operating 
primarily in the Mainland. While there may be an R&D office in Silicon Valley, all other 
functions are located in China. As a result, these firms have more employees in China than the 
US, and their top executives spend most of their time in China--or on airplanes between Silicon 
Valley and China!  
 UTStarCom, for example, provides telecommunications network infrastructure for the 
Chinese market. It was started by a US-educated engineer and is headquartered in Silicon Valley, 
where is has 30 employees, but has 1000 employees in China, making it the third largest 
producer in Beijing's Zhongguancun Science Park. Sina.com, which has followed a similar 
model, with its origins and base in Silicon Valley, is now the leading Internet portal in China. 
Both companies went public on NASDAQ in 2000. Jason Wu's NetFont, an Internet security 
software products co primarily targeting the mainland market, likewise has 10 people in Silicon 
Valley and 60 in Beijing. CEO Wu reports that he spends 90% of his time in the China 
operations.  
In sum, Mainland Chinese engineers returned home at an increasing rate in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s, spurred at least in part by active recruitment by local and provincial 
  28 governments. Many became entrepreneurs, starting telecommunications and Internet-related 
companies to serve the domestic Chinese market, while also maintaining close ties to the US. 
The growth of a transnational community linking Silicon Valley and China parallels that 
established a decade earlier between Taiwan and Silicon Valley--and is accelerating the creation 
of information technology-related capabilities in China. 
The large-scale commitments made by U.S. and Taiwanese investors in semiconductor 
manufacturing in 2000 and 2001 illustrate how a transnational community can radically 
accelerate the emergence of new nodes in the global production networks. As US-educated 
Mainland Chinese integrated into the technical communities established by their Taiwanese 
predecessors in the late 1990s, they identified new entrepreneurial opportunities associated with 
exploiting China's relatively low cost skill base while also targeting the potentially vast domestic 
market. In this case, the technical and managerial know-how as well as the business and market 
connections accumulated among the Taiwanese transnational community are being transferred to 
Shanghai.  
As Chinese engineers extend their technical networks from Silicon Valley and Taiwan to 
the Mainland, they are not only creating an important new global source of information and 
communications technology-related production, but also further deepening the division of labor 
and compelling greater specialization of existing nodes in the global production network such as 
Taiwan and Silicon Valley. 
Conclusions  
This paper has explored the close and complementary relationships between transnational 
communities and global production networks. A transnational technical community is not 
necessary for a region or nation to participate in global production, but such a community can 
  29 significantly improve a region's position in the global hierarchy by providing a source of world-
class skill and tacit knowledge, as well as close connections to leading edge markets and 
technologies. At the limit, transnational entrepreneurs supported by a technical community and 
supportive domestic infrastructure can even establish new flagship companies that destabilize 
existing hierarchies.   
Taiwan, India and China have all emerged as important new nodes for the production of 
information and communications technologies over the past two decades, but they have followed 
different trajectories. Taiwan's well-developed transnational community was critical to the 
formation and subsequent upgrading of a localized cluster of producers, who benefited greatly 
from direct links to Silicon Valley's technology and markets. A reversal of the brain drain and 
the growth of transnational entrepreneurship in Taiwan's PC and IC industries in turn accounts 
for its participation in global networks as a higher-level supplier than many of its East Asian 
counterparts. 
  India's emergence as a major exporter of software programming and development skill 
owes its growth in part to the early contracts provided by the Indian business community in the 
U.S. And the transnational community that has emerged recently linking Silicon Valley to 
regions like Bangalore has promoted a beneficial dynamic of "brain circulation." However India 
has failed to tap large and highly educated pool of US-educated Indian engineers and scientists to 
become transnational entrepreneurs, and so remains a relatively low value added producer in 
global production networks. 
  Finally, China appears poised to follow Taiwan's trajectory a decade later. While the 
transnational community is in its formative stages the Mainland Chinese have already benefited 
from growing ties with the Taiwanese technical community. Domestic policymakers have 
  30 aggressively, and apparently successfully, recruited transnational entrepreneurs from Silicon 
Valley. While there remains uncertainty in the political environment, China has emerged as a 
node in global production networks with the potential to surpass Taiwan as an international IT 
manufacturing and logistics center.  Indeed, the combination of close ties to Silicon Valley and a 
huge domestic market means that in time China could even become a source of innovative new 
flagship companies, not simply a secondary or tertiary tier in global networks.  
   This paper explores Chinese and Indians transnational communities because they are the 
largest groups of immigrant engineers in the U.S., and their technical communities are heavily 
concentrated in Silicon Valley. However other groups of US-educated immigrant engineers 
provide sources of transnational entrepreneurship. A transnational community of Israeli 
engineers and entrepreneurs has played a similar role in developing Israel's technology industry--
in this case at a higher technological level than either India or Taiwan (Autler, 2000.) Likewise 
US-educated Irish immigrants have built strong ties to the Boston (Massachusetts) technology 
community and many have returned home and contributed directly to the growth of Ireland's 
software and IT industries (O'Riain, 2000.) It would be worthwhile, for example, to explore the 
experience of Korean and Japanese immigrant engineers and scientists in the U.S. Future 
research should also explore the nature and extent of transnational communities from other parts 
of the world that have attracted large numbers of immigrant engineers and scientist, including 
Australia, the United Kingdom, and Japan.  
  For policymakers, the lessons from this research are clear. The brain drain offers 
substantial unintended assets, but only to countries that actively pursue them. By actively 
recruiting returnees and providing attractive environment for transnational entrepreneurs, 
policymakers in Taiwan and China have capitalized on their overseas Chinese engineers and 
  31 scientists. Indian policymakers, with a more laissez-faire approach toward the overseas 
community, have failed to fully exploit this tremendous resource, in part because of failures to 
improve the domestic infrastructure and regulatory environment. A transnational technical 
community provides a developing country with privileged connections to world-class technical 
talent as well as access to the world's leading technology producers. In today's volatile and fast-
changing economy, these personal connections are far more flexible and responsive than 
multinational corporations, and can facilitate the rapid adaptation of domestic capabilities to 
facilitate the upgrading of the position of local firms in global production networks. 
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